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I shall not address these sorts of questions and problems in this paper.
1 I shall rather address the relationship between topological and measure-theoretic methods in probabilistic reasoning and the problems that arise for it in the case of infinite-dimensional spaces, as naturally occur in cosmology.
Although it is far more common to associate the mathematical theory of measure spaces with probabilistic notions and reasoning, if one takes a broad-minded view of what counts as "probabilistic" reasoning, then, in many areas of physics, topological concepts and methods ground much of what it is reasonable to think of as probabilistic reasoning. This is particularly true in a science such as cosmology, in which well defined probability measures over families of systems are few and far between. In such situations, physicists often argue that a property or behavior of interest is typical or generic or stable in a family of possible systems, or is scarce or meagre or rigid, and so on, with no serious attempt to make those ideas quantitatively precise, though they clearly are intended to have probabilistic import. Often, the arguments are grounded on topological considerations with gestures at interpreting the conclusions in measure-theoretic terms so as to justify the intended probabilistic import. Say we are interested in the likelihood of the appearance of a particular feature (having a singularity, e.g.) in a given family of spacetimes satisfying some fixed condition (say, being spatially open). If one can convincingly argue that spacetimes with that feature form a "large" open set in some appropriate, physically motivated topology on the family, then one concludes that such spacetimes are generic in the family, and so have high prior probability of occurring. If one can similarly
show that such spacetimes form a meagre or nowhere-dense set in the family, one concludes they have essentially zero probability. The intuition underlying the conclusions always seems to be that, though we may not be able to define it in the current state of knowledge, there should be a physically significant measure consonant with the topology in the sense that it will assign large measure to "large" open sets and essentially zero measure to meagre or nowhere-dense sets. Similarly for stability and rigidity: if one can show that a given feature is topologically stable under "small" perturbations, one can conclude that the probability is very high that a spacetime approximately satisfying the relevant conditions will still have the feature; if the feature is topologically rigid under "small" perturbations, one can conclude that the probability is essentially zero that a spacetime approximately satisfying the relevant conditions will still have the feature. In order to justify the probabilistic nature of the conclusion, one again assumes the existence of an appropriate measure consonant with the topology in the sense that the smallness of the pertubation is to be judged by the fact that the resulting spacetime is in a neighborhood of the initial spacetime, of "small" measure.
In cosmology, reasoning of this form occurs ubiquitously, in the context of the following kinds of problem:
1. characterizing the likelihood of observing certain kinds of events, given the situation of possible observers in a spacetime, i.e., the fact that observers are limited in observations to what lies in their past light-cone, by the sensitivity of their apparatus, by the amount of time a process will emit energy of a given magnitude or greater, and by how far to the past of the observers 1 See Ellis (2007) and Smeenk (2012a Smeenk ( , 2012b for excellent reviews and discussion of these questions and problems.
such processes may occur 2. characterizing the likelihood that the value of a universal constant lies within a fixed range 3. characterizing the likelihood that cosmological initial conditions of a particular kind or form, or having a particular property or characteristic, obtained 4. characterizing the likelihood that large-scale structure of a particular kind would form 5. characterizing the likelihood that a spacetime has a particular global (causal, topological, projective, conformal, affine, metrical) property
Common specific examples of such problems are:
1. characterizing the likelihood that observers such as ourselves would come to exist in the sort of spatiotemporal region we occupy in a spacetime of this sort 2. characterizing the likelihood that we are "typical" observers in the universe 3. characterizing the likelihood that the cosmological constant has any non-zero value, and has, moreover, a value near that actually observed 4. characterizing the likelihood of various "fine-tuning coincidences": the seeming equality of densities of dark energy and dark matter in the current epoch; the approximate flatness of the observed universe; the approximate isotropy and spatial homogeneity of the observed universe; the seemingly required special entropic state of the very early universe; etc.
characterizing the likelihood that a spatially open spacetime is future-singular
In most branches of physics, one would address such problems by fixing an appropriate reference class of physical systems and a physically significant probability-measure on that class. When one cannot rigorously define such a measure, or one is not that interested in quantitative exactness, one will often rest content with arguing (or just stipulating) that a physically significant measure exists whose distribution of weight harmonizes in a particular way with a natural topology on the class of systems, to wit, one assumes that non-trivial positivity of measure is at least strongly correlated with openness of sets and likewise that smallness or nullness of measure is correlated with topological meagreness of sets. In this case, one will base one's estimates of likelihood on the topological properties of the families of systems at issue.
Even in cases where one does have a well defined measure to give quantitative exactness to estimates of genericity or typicality, however, one still needs the measure to harmonize with an underlying reasonable topology in the appropriate way. The point is simple, though it does not seem to be widely appreciated or even recognized, either in the physics or the philosophy literature: genericity and typicality, roughly speaking, mean something like "most systems are similar in this respect"
(and mutatis mutandis for meagreness and scarcity); "most", however, is a measure-theoretic notion,
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family of such systems forms a set of large measure; a given family of physical systems are similar in a given respect if the topological neighborhood-systems of the elements of the space representing the physical systems stand in some appropriate relation to each other, which often will be as simple as the fact that the family of elements representing the physical systems forms an open set.
In cosmology, however, the systems one most often focuses on are entire spacetimes, and families of spacetimes usually form infinite-dimensional spaces of a particular kind. And now one comes to the heart of the problem: it is a theorem (as I discuss in some detail in §3 below) that infinitedimensional spaces of that kind do not admit non-trivial measures that harmonize in the right way with any underlying reasonable topology. It follows that one simply does not have available the kinds of reasoning normally employed to draw even qualitative conclusions about the likelihoods of properties or features or behaviors of spacetimes. To be clear, I do not claim that it is not possible to draw well grounded conclusions about such likelihoods, only that arguments of the standard forms cannot, not even in principle, be made rigorous, and so conclusions based on them are prima facie suspect, and should be treated with far more caution and skepticism than is common in the physics and philosophy literature. It is exactly the standard forms of argument, however, that cosmologists make when reasoning about likelihoods.
In §2, I quickly review the basics of topology, measure theory and probability theory, emphasizing technical and interpretative points that the rest of the paper relies on. Cognoscenti may want to skip that section, though I do discuss some issues (such as the character of topologies on spaces of functions, and the topological character of the uniqueness of the Lebesgue measure on R n ) sometimes unfamiliar even to those with a solid grounding in topology and measure theory. I also present the basic facts about topology in a somewhat unusual way, based on the idea of an accumulation point, which is particularly suited to the goals of this paper. In my presentation of the basics of probability, moreover, I focus on those foundational problems most relevant to the kinds of cosmological argument I examine. In §3, I briefly rehearse the relevant aspects of topology and measure theory in the context of infinite-dimensional Fréchet spaces, and conclude with a statement of the fundamental theorem relevant to this paper and explain its import. In §4.1, I discuss the few well defined topologies on families of spacetimes commonly used in cosmology, and show that they have severe problems of physical interpretation on their own. In §4.2, I do the same for the only known example of a well defined measure on a finite-dimensional family of spacetimes of real physical interest. I conclude in §5 with a discussion of several standard cosmological arguments about likelihood in the context of infinite-dimensional spaces of spacetimes, and show how the reasoning runs afoul of the mismatch between topology and measure in such spaces.
2 One can of course quantify similarity using a metric as well, but in this case the metric will give rise to a topology.
The measure will still have to harmonize with the metric and so will automatically harmonize (or not) with the induced topology.
2 Topology, Measure, Probability
Topological Spaces
A topology T is a family of sets, including the null set ∅, closed under arbitrary unions and finite intersections.
3 In particular, the union T of all elements of T itself belongs to T, and is called the topological space with topology T. The elements of T are its open sets; a neighborhood of a point of T is a subset of T, not necessarily in T, that contains an open set containing that point. In general, one can associate many different topologies with the same set of points T. (We will, however, still abuse notation and terminology in the usual way when no ambiguity can arise, sometimes referring to a topological space simply by its associated set without specifying which topology on it we mean.)
As is always the case with mathematical fields of study, there are many ways to think about the subject of topology, both in the sense of intuitive visualization and in the sense of rigorous formalization. For our purposes, the sense in which topology captures the idea of the study of "continuity"-what remains invariant under deformations of a space that don't rip or puncture it and don't glue different parts together-is the most important. 4 The neighborhoods of a topology capture an idea of relative proximity relevant to the idea of continuity: two points of the underlying set are in proximity (relative to the fixed topology) if the family of neighborhoods of one stands in one of a number of relations to the family of neighborhoods of the other. Intutively speaking, a neighborhood is a region of the space in which, at the point of which it is a neighborhood, "arbitrarily small perturbations" don't take one out of the region. If one thinks of the topology as capturing something like a similarity relation among entities, then a neighborhood of an entity is a collection of other entities similar to the first to some degree.
For our purposes, one of the most important of these relations among families of neighborhoods is grounded on the idea of an accumulation point. Given any subset O ⊂ T (whether an open set or not), an accumulation point of O is a point p such that every neighborhood of p has a non-trivial intersection with O −{p}. In agreeably suggestive language, one may say that an accumulation point is "arbitrarily close" to its associated set. Much information about the topology of a topological space is encoded in the behavior of infinite sequences of points, and in particular by the situation of any accumulation points they may have. (Indeed, under mild restrictions, which all the examples we consider here satisfy, a topology can be fully characterized by the behavior of the accumulation points of all infinite sequences.) A set is closed if it contains all its accumulation points.
Given a sequence P = {p i } (i ∈ I ↑ , the non-negative integers), we say P is eventually in a set O if there is an m ∈ I ↑ such that p n ∈ O for all n > m. Clearly, if there is a p such that a sequence P is eventually in every one of its neighborhoods, then p is an accumulation point of P . In this case, we say P converges to p. An open cover of a subset of a topological space is a family of open sets whose union contains the subset. A subcover of a cover is a subset of the cover that is also itself a cover. Compact sets have particularly pleasant properties for our purposes, perhaps the two most important of which are that, first, under mild restrictions on the topology, every infinite sequence in a compact set has at least one accumulation point, and, second, under no restrictions at all on the topology, the Cartesian product of any family of compact spaces is itself compact under the natural product topology. (The latter statement is known as Tychonov's Theorem.) Intuitively speaking, then, compact sets don't "extend out to infinity", and they also contain "every point they could possibly have had in the first place"-in a natural sense, they are bounded, and they don't have necessarily, converge to a cluster point. Roughly speaking, a sequence may ceaselessly approach arbitrarily close to and then recede from a cluster point, but never come to remain permanently near it.
any gaps or holes. An important weakening of the notion of compactness retains almost all its nice properties: a topological space is locally compact if every point has a compact neighborhood.
Finally, we record a few definitions and propositions that will play an important role in what follows. A subset D of a topological space is dense if every point of the space is an accumulation point of some sequence of points in D. Intuitively, D extends arbitrarily closely to every point of the space. The rational numbers, for example, form a dense subset of R (indeed, a countable one).
A topological space is separable if it has a countable dense subset. A subset of a topological space is nowhere dense if the union of the set and all its accumulation points do not contain an open set. If a subset N is nowhere dense, then, given any point not in N , one can find a neighborhood around that point such that no sequence in N accumulates on the neighborhood.
The case of most interest for us will be topologies on the family of continuous, differentiable or smooth functions between two topological spaces-in particular, the family of cross-sections on the fiber bundle of Lorentz metrics over a candidate spacetime manifold (connected, paracompact, Hausdorff, four-dimensional).
6 Consider two topological spaces T 1 and T 2 , and the family of continuous functions F from the former to the latter. Define
The family of all such collections, for all such K and O, forms a subbase for the compact-open topology on F. 7 A topology on F is said to be jointly continuous if the mapping
is itself continuous, in the product topology on F × T 1 . Most relatively well behaved topologies on spaces over which one considers spaces of functionsand in particular all the ones we will consider here-are Hausdorff, separable, regular, and locally compact.
6 A topological space is connected if it is not the union of two open, nonempty, disjoint sets. The exact definition of paracompactness is too involved to give here; suffice it to say that it means the space is not "too big". Indeed, one has to work hard to construct a topological space that is not paracompact (Hocking and Young 1988) . In any event, a theorem due to Geroch (1969) shows that a manifold has a Lorentz metric only if it is paracompact, so we lose nothing by restricting attention to such manifolds. 
Measure Spaces
A σ-algebra is an ordered pair (S, Σ) consisting of a set S, and a non-empty collection of subsets of S, Σ, closed under the operations of finite set-differences and countable unions. 9 Where no confusion can arise, we will often abuse notation in the standard way and refer to Σ itself as the σ-algebra.
Write 'R ↑ ' for the set of non-negative real numbers.
A measure space is an ordered pair consisting of a σ-algebra and a measure on it; the elements of the σ-algebra are called measurable sets. It follows from the definitions that the null set ∅ is always measurable, and any measure assigns value zero to it. 10 In general, however, the null set will not be the only set assigned a measure of zero. We say a property that holds for all points of a measure space except for a subset of measure zero holds almost everywhere.
A σ-algebra has much the same feel about it as a topology, naturally giving rise to the question whether one can construct measures on topological spaces that relate in a natural way to the topology. A Borel measure, in an obvious and natural sense, respects the topology of the underlying topological space. 11 It is a simple matter to construct a natural Borel measure on R: one is uniquely picked out by the requirement that µ([a, b]) = b − a for every real interval [a, b] . This measure suitably generalized to R n is not however unique, and its multiplicity can be traced to the fact that it lacks one feature, completeness, that it is convenient to have: we say a measure is complete if every subset of every set of measure zero is itself measurable (and so necessarily of measure zero).
An extension of a measure space (S, Σ, µ) is another measure space (S, Σ , µ ) such that Σ ⊂ Σ and µ (A) = µ(A) for all A ∈ Σ. The following is easily proven.
9 All the material I cover in this section is developed with thoroughness and illuminating insight in Halmos (1950) . 10 While it is not unusual, it is also not entirely standard to demand condition 1 for a measure. I do it because it simplifies matter greatly, in particular guaranteeing that the null set is measurable, of measure zero, without having to require it as a separate axiom. Also, it seems to me a quite reasonable bare minimum one should require of something one wants to call a measure, if it is to be useful in physics at all.
11 Again, while not unusual, it is not wholly standard to demand that a Borel measure assigns finite measure to all compact sets. And, again, this seems to me the minimum one should require of such a thing for it to be usefully applicable in physics.
Proposition 2.2.3 There is exactly one complete extension of all natural Borel measures on R n (for any n ∈ I ↑ ).
Lebesgue measure µ l on R n is the unique complete extension of any of the natural Borel measures.
Any countable subset of R n has Lebesgue measure zero, but uncountable subsets also can. The
Cantor Set is an example.
Let A be a subset of R n ; then, for any p ∈ R n , denote by 'A + p' the set that results by adding p to every element of A, sometimes called the p-translate of A. Now, the following proposition shows the most important properties of Lebesgue measure in relation to the natural topology and linear structure on R n .
Proposition 2.2.4 Lebesgue measure is locally finite, strictly positive and translation invariant,
i.e.:
(Lebesgue measure is obviously not the unique measure satisfying these conditions, because there are non-complete Borel measures that also satisfy them.) The translation invariance of Lebesgue measure is commonly taken to be its most characteristic feature, to the point that any translationinvariant measure on any linear space is often referred to as a Lebesgue measure. The analogous property is particularly important in a measure that would be used to define a probability space over a family of events that itself has an appropriate algebraic structure, for reasons I discuss in §2.3
below.
The following theorem captures the precise sense in which Lebesgue measure is the unique measure that respects both the topology and the linear structure of R n .
Theorem 2.2.5 Lebesgue measure is the unique complete, translation-invariant measure on the Borel sets in R n .
From hereon, we will consider only Borel measures that are, like Lebesgue measure, strictly nonnegative (i.e., ones that assign negative values to no measurable set).
Probability
Measures allow for one elegant and important way to formalize the notion of probability: a probability space is an ordered pair consisting of a σ-algebra (P, Π) and a strictly positive measure µ on it such that µ(P) = 1. Intuitively speaking, the elements of P represent the totality of possible outcomes for some family of phenomena we are interested in, those of Π the collections of outcomes to which it makes sense to assign probabilities, and the value assigned by µ to an element of Π the probability of that collection of outcomes. It is trivial to show that a probability space satisfies the standard Kolmogorov axioms of probability theory.
It is of fundamental importance to recognize that, when one wants to be precise, clear and unambiguous, it never makes sense to ask for "the probability" simpliciter of some event or collection of events. One must have in hand a probability space that includes the event or collection of events in its σ-algebra (or, at least, some structure formally equivalent to one). In general, for any given event or collection of events, there will be many, many, many such probability spaces, with different σ-algebras and with different measures. Picking the most appropriate σ-algebra for the question or investigation at hand is known as the reference-class problem. I am not aware of any standard name for the problem of picking the most appropriate measure, but it is equally as important and difficult in general as the reference-class problem. The kinds of consideration that should bear on those choices will depend on the nature of the subject matter one is treating, and on the nature of the problem concerning that subject matter. In physics, of course, when using measures to assign probabilities to collections of events, one wants to find a σ-algebra that represents "all appropriately similar events", where the similarity has manifest physical significance for the problem at issue, and to fix a measure on it that captures a property of real physical significance shared by the events that relates in a clear, direct, determinate way to the probabilities one wants to characterize. 12 Without having made sure that the measure latches on to and respects a physically significant feature of the problem space with manifest relevance to the determination of probabilities, there will be no reason to think of the values the measure assigns as representing real physical probabilities. All these issues play a crucial role in attempts to evaluate the soundness of many kinds of argument in cosmology.
Although measures on their own can be used to define probability spaces, it is often the case that topological considerations play an important role in probabilistic reasoning. It is almost always desirable, for instance, especially in physics, for an appropriate probability measure to be a Borel measure, and in particular to assign non-zero probability to any collection of outcomes that forms an open set in a physically natural topology. This captures the idea that, if an event has non-zero probability (measure greater than zero), then "arbitrarily small" perturbations of it shouldn't render the result impossible, i.e., send it into a set of measure zero. One can guarantee this by having the original event lie in an open set, which, because the measure is Borel, will have positive measure.
If this were not the case, then, given the necessarily limited precision of observations in physics, we would find ourselves in the position of predicting outcomes with non-zero probability that we could never in principle observe.
Topology plays other important roles in probabilistic reasoning as well. In many cases, the quantitative exactness delivered by a measure is either not feasible or not desirable. Sometimes it is enough merely to know that an event is very likely or not likely at all, without attaching a quantitatively exact probability to it. Let's say that we make a prediction for the dynamical evolution of a system starting from a set of exact initial conditions. We want to know how likely it is that the system, if prepared with approximately those initial conditions will evolve in approximately the predicted way. (Roughly speaking, this is known as the Hadamard stability problem for the initial-value formulation of the system.) One natural way to make the question precise is to find 12 Peirce (1878a, 1878b) gives a particularly beautiful discussion of these issues, although of course he does not use the language of measures.
appropriate topologies for the space of initial conditions and the space of dynamical evolutions, define the mapping taking initial conditions to dynamical evolutions, and determine whether it is jointly continuous. ("Do arbitrarily small perturbations of the initial conditions leave the later dynamical behavior essentially unchanged?") If so, then, if the prediction is sound and if we have good reason to believe that the system starts with initial conditions close enough to the exact initial conditions used to generate the prediction, it is very likely that we will get the expected behavior even though we know that, due to the finite exactness of measurement and preparation, the system almost certainly did not start with those exact initial conditions. If the mapping is not jointly continuous, then it may be very unlikely that we will get the expected behavior, no matter how close to the exact initial conditions the system starts evolving from. (This is one of the reasons why it is almost always desirable, from a physical point of view, to have one's function-space topology be jointly continuous.)
In a closely related vein, say that we have found an appropriate topology for the space representing the possible states of a type of system, and that, moreover, the points of that space representing the system as possessing a certain property with values in a fixed range form an open dense subset.
13
Then there is a natural sense in which it is overwhelmingly likely that an appropriately random sampling of such systems will all evince values for the given property falling within the fixed range. If the subset is nowhere dense, it is very unlikely to find a system having the property with value in the fixed range in an appropriately random sample.
14 Of course, one must bear in mind that such conclusions depend not only on the physical propriety of the topology one has fixed on the space of states, but, at least as importantly, they depend on the propriety of the mechanism one has chosen to construct the random sample. If one's sampling mechanism is biased in some way, then it doesn't matter how "appropriate" one's measure is-one will not get physically reliable results. Again, these issues play a crucial role in the evaluation of many kinds of cosmological argument.
Finally, one can use measures in similar ways to draw qualitative judgments about the likelihood of an event or kind of event: a property that holds almost everywhere in an appropriate measure space will be very likely to occur, and one that holds in a set of measure zero will be very unlikely, even if the measure is not a probability measure, so long as one has been able to demonstrate an appropriate relation between the measure and the relevant physical properties of the system at issue.
It is only in the latter case that the value the measure attributes to a set may reasonably be thought of as a representation of a real physical probability for the class of events in the set.
13 If the topology arises from or is compatible with a complete metric, one can use the more general criterion that the set be a G δ -set, i.e., that it be a countable intersection of open dense subsets, in so far as the complement of a G δ -set in this case is nowhere dense.
14 If the topology arises from or is compatible with a complete metric, one can use the more general criterion that the set be meagre, i.e., that it be a countable union of nowhere dense subsets, in so far as the complement of a meagre set in this case is dense. (This is known as the Baire Category Theorem.)
Now, as we have seen, there is a natural sense in which, in R n , Lebesgue measure respects both the topology and the linear structure, both of which are desirable features in a measure one wants to found probabilistic reasoning on, for the reasons discussed in §2.3, inter alia. The situation in infinite-dimensional spaces, therefore, as we will see, poses considerable problems for the hopeful physicist. This matters because, for our purposes-the application of probabilistic reasoning to families of spacetimes-the natural spaces one works with are spaces of functions (Lorentzian metrics on differential manifolds). These spaces tend to be infinite-dimensional spaces with natural (locally) algebraic structures accruing to them.
To apply probabilistic reasoning to families of spacetimes, one must first choose what sort of spacetime metric one is going to work with, C n or C ∞ . Each has virtues and demerits. To see what is at issue in a simpler setting, consider the set of functions on the unit disk. For C n functions, we have the norm
resulting in a Banach space, since this norm is complete for any finite n-because the disk is compact and the functions are continuous, the supremum is always finite. (A Banach space is a normed vector space, complete with respect to the metric the norm induces.) For C ∞ , we do not get a Banach space because the resulting infinite sum may not converge. Instead, we define
which manifestly converges. This operation defines a metric in the obvious way, (f, g) = f − g and this metric is complete in the sense that all its Cauchy sequences converge to a point in the space. This operation, however, does not define a norm, since it is not the case that af = |a| f for scalar a. (There is no norm for C ∞ functions that both accounts for all their derivatives and, in a natural sense, extends the norm for C n functions.) The metric is, however, manifestly invariant with respect to translations. The resulting space is a Fréchet space: a metrizable, locally convex vector space, complete with respect to a translation-invariant metric.
Is it true in such a large space that every well-behaved vector field has unique integral curves (a necessity, e.g., for certain forms of local stability analysis)? In a Banach space, yes, but in a Fréchet space, no. (Sometimes there are no integral curves, sometimes they are not unique.) As an example of the way things can go awry, consider a map φ from functions on the disk to functions on the disk defined as follows:
15 I thank Bob Geroch for conversations in which we worked out the details of this example.
for ξ a a vector field on the disk. φ wants to be a linear functional on our space of functions, i.e., to be a vector field on the vector space of functions on the disk, but, while it is in fact a vector field on the Fréchet space of C ∞ functions, it is not one on the Banach space of C n functions, since for f ∈ C n it is not necessarily the case that ∇ a f ∈ C n . On the Fréchet space, however, the vector field resulting from this mapping does not yield unique solutions-when one slides a function along the disk, as the mapping in effect asks one to do, one gets to make up whatever one wants to fill up the "back" part of the disk, as the "front" part of the function slides off the disk, i.e.,
has no unique integral curves. So one can have unique integral curves, but no vector field (on Banach space), or a vector field but no unique integral curves (on Fréchet space). In general, however, there may be difficulties with defining tangent vectors to curves on a Fréchet space. In a Banach space B, γ : R → B has derivative v ∈ B if, ∀ > 0, ∃c > 0 such that
for |t − t 0 | < . In a Fréchet space, however, one has no norm, only a metric, and if one uses the metric to try to define derivatives, nice properties like "sum of two differentiable vector fields is a differentiable vector field" will likely fail since one does not have the nice norm properties. Now, once one has bitten the bullet and chosen to work with the type of space one considers the lesser of two evils, one might have thought that all one's travail would be behind one. Sadly, no.
Theorem 3.1 The only locally finite, translation-invariant Borel measure on an infinite-dimensional, separable Fréchet space is the trivial measure ( viz., the one that assigns measure zero to every measurable set).
Thus, since a Banach space is automatically a Fréchet space, any translation-invariant measure on any reasonably well behaved infinite-dimensional space assigns infinite measure to all open sets, unless the measure is the trivial measure.
16
Before we abandon all hope, however, the hopeful cosmologist can now point out that the family of Lorentz metrics on a fixed manifold is not actually a Fréchet space: in particular, it is not a vector space, since the sum of two Lorentz metrics is not in general itself a Lorentz metric. In fact, the family of Lorentz metrics forms a Fréchet manifold, an infinite-dimensional manifold G with the local structure of a separable Fréchet space F , rather than the local structure of R n as for an ordinary differential manifold. (See Geroch 1975 for a rigorous characterization of such manifolds and a discussion of their properties.) For such a manifold, it is not required that the subsets that define the charts themselves have a full vector-space structure. (In fact, they usually won't.) One demands for the charts (U i , φ i ) only that:
1. the union of all U i is the entire manifold G 16 See, e.g., Hunt, Sauer, and Yorke (1992) for a discussion of the theory, and some interesting possible generalizations of relevant measure-like notions to the infinite-dimensional case, which I hope to discuss in future work. 
each φ i is a bijection from

Topologies and Measures on Families of Spacetimes
Even though, as should now be clear, we cannot hope for the most satisfactory framework-a well behaved Borel measure-on which to found probabilistic reasoning about families of spacetimes, we may still hope to find topologies or measures on their own appropriate for addressing specific sorts of problems. Perhaps, the hope goes, we can find a well behaved, physically significant measure that will return probabilities in such a way that its lack of relation to a topology will not necessarily lead to conundrums or implausibility. Or perhaps we can find a topology that, though not related to a measure, will still allow us to reason qualitatively about likelihoods in a physically significant way.
Alas, in the event, things do not look good.
Topologies
Fix a candidate spacetime manifold M , and consider the family G of all Lorentz metrics on it, i.e., the family of all cross-sections of the fiber bundle of Lorentz metrics over M . There are two standard 17 See Geroch (1975) for a definition of the Fréchet derivative. 18 I do not know of a proof of this theorem in the literature, but it is not difficult to show. topologies relativists impose on G when addressing problems related to likelihoods. The first is a standard compact-open topology on a function space; the second is a standard Whitney topology on a function space.
19 (The compact-open is strictly coarser than the Whitney, unless M itself is compact, in which case the two coincide; we will not consider that case.) The idea behind each is to fix a standard of "distance" between Lorentz metrics by fixing an arbitrary positive-definite metric on M and using it to assign magnitudes to the algebraic differences of Lorentz metrics. As we shall see, both have severe problems of physical interpretation, which can in large part be traced to the fact that the positive-definite metrics themselves used to fix the similarity relations among Lorentz metrics have no physical significance. Roughly speaking, the Whitney topology cares whether or not metrics are similar on the entire 19 Geroch (1971) calls the former the coarse and the latter the fine topology. Hawking (1971) calls the latter the open topology, and calls a yet finer topology the fine topology. We shall not consider here the fine topology of Hawking (1971) , for, as we shall soon see, the Whitney topology already has "too many open sets". Another common class of topologies used in relativity theory are the Sobolev topologies, which play an important role in the analysis of the Cauchy problem in general relativity (Ringström 2009 ). Since these are even finer than the finest one Hawking (1971) considers, and since we shall not discuss the Cauchy problem, we shall, again, not worry about them. 20 See Geroch (1967 Geroch ( , 1971 and Fletcher (2015) for insightful discussions of these problems. 21 One can also form compact-open topologies that account for derivatives of the Lorentz metrics and how they differ, but we will not need to do so. 22 This sequence of metrics does not converge at all under the Whitney topology, which one may perhaps think of as the "correct" or "naturally expected" result.
a given Lorentz metric g ab is determined by a positive-definite metric h ab on M , and a real number > 0. A Lorentz metric g ab is in the neighborhood if and only if h mn h rs (g mr − g mr )(g ns − g ns ) <
everywhere in M . The family of all such neighborhoods forms a subbase for the topology. 23 The
Whitney topology also has the pleasant properties of being locally compact, Hausdorff and regular (because the fiber bundle of Lorentz metrics over M is).
The Whitney topology fares even worse than the compact-open one with regard to physical significance, as examples from Geroch (1970 Geroch ( , 1971 again show. Consider the sequence of metrics on R 4 of the form diag(t m , −1, −1, −1), for m ∈ I + , where now t m := 1 + 1 m 2 + x 2 + y 2 + z 2 . Each metric in this family is essentially flat almost everywhere except for a spherically symmetric bump of curvature centered on the origin; this bump, moreover, decreases smoothly to zero as m increases. This sequence, however, does not converge to Minkowski spacetime under the Whitney topology. Even more egregiously, the one-parameter family of metrics {λg ab }, for λ ∈ R + (the set of strictly positive real numbers), where g ab is any Lorentz metric on any non-compact M , fails to be a continuous curve under the Whitney metric. But each metric in the family represents the same physical spacetime! Multiplying a spacetime metric by a constant does nothing other than change the effective units one (implicitly) uses to quantify physical magnitudes such as mass and acceleration. 24 The problem now is that the Whitney topology is too fine-it has so many open sets that almost no reasonable sequence will converge.
One could perhaps argue with some justice that Geroch's example speaking against the compactopen topology is not so bad as to preclude its usefulness in many cases and for many purposes, and I would not necessarily disagree. The problem arises in the example because the compact-open topology, roughly speaking, does not contain enough open sets to control the similarity relations between metrics with respect to their asymptotic behavior. In other words, it does not care about global similarity, only local similarity. For the sorts of problems for which one would want to use a topology on a family of spacetime metrics to ground qualitative probabilistic reasoning in the context of cosmology, however, it is exactly the global similarity of metrics that will in general be at issue. We will see physically important examples of this in §5 below. The Whitney topology rules unhelpfully in such simple and fundamental cases as to make it, to my mind, never a viable option for addressing global issues.
25
It will be useful to conclude the section by considering problems with these topologies in the 23 One can also form Whitney topologies that account for derivatives of the Lorentz metrics and how they differ, but again we will not need to do so. 24 The compact-open topology seems to get both of these examples right: under it, the sequence converges to
Minkowski spacetime, and the one-parameter family forms a continuous curve. 25 One may thus wonder about the usefulness of the Sobolev measures used in analyzing the stability of the Cauchy problem in general relativity, for those topologies are always strictly finer even than the Whitney topology. In fact, though, in this case the promiscuity of the topologies is a virtue-one wants to show stability under as difficult conditions as possible. Even though one may not be able to elucidate the physical significance of the Sobolev topologies, they are surely finer than any topology one will be able so to elucidate, and so stability under the Sobolev topologies ensures stability under more restrained, more physically plausible ones, whatever they may be.
context of a more physically interesting example, to substantiate my claims. Consider the question of the stability of the occurrence of singularities in the family of metrics over a given manifold. One wants to show that the occurrence of a singularity is (topologically) stable "under small perturbations". (I discuss this question, and the problems facing attempts to address it, in more detail in §5 below.) In this case, the impropriety of the Whitney topology can be easily illustrated by noting that any reasonable sense of "small perturbation" will yield an operation discontinuous with respect to it.
For example, given a spacetime (M, g ab ), one might define a small perturbation as follows. Consider a one-parameter family of spacetimes M := {(M, (1 + φ λ )g ab ) : λ ∈ [0, )}, for some small , where each φ λ is a non-negative smooth function on M such that 0 ≥ sup M φ λ < λ < sup M φ λ < λ, for all λ , λ ∈ [0, ), and the family of functions {φ λ } varies smoothly with respect to λ in the supremum norm, and the supremum approaches zero "slowly".
is a small perturbation off g ab . It is easy to see by construction that M forms an everywhere discontinuous curve on the family of metrics with respect to the Whitney topology, and so any property of (M, g ab ) one may want to consider is trivially stable under such small perturbations. (The only physically reasonable "small perturbation" continuous with respect to the Whitney topology is the identity operation.)
Non-trivial small perturbations defined in this way can easily be constructed so as to be continuous with respect to the compact-open topology, so this looks initially more promising. For the treatment of singularities, though, the compact-open topology is not physically appropriate. If one characterizes a singularity by the existence of incomplete, inextendible causal geodesics, then the compact-open topology will never be able to discriminate singular from non-singular metrics: it is only in highly pathological cases that incomplete, inextendible geodesics are contained in compact subsets of a spacetime (Curiel 1999) . Every open neighborhood of a singular metric in the compact-open topology contains non-singular metrics, and vice-versa. There are no other well defined topologies on the family of Lorentz metrics standardly used by physicists. 
Measures
The space of Lorentz metrics over a manifold-the family of possible spacetime models having that as its underlying manifold-is an infinite-dimensional Fréchet manifold, and so by theorem 3.2 it has no non-trivial Borel measure. The only rigorously defined measure on a reasonably interesting family of spacetimes is the Gibbons-Hawking-Stewart (GHS) measure µ ghs on "minisuperspace" Γ (Gibbons, Hawking, and Stewart 1987) . Roughly speaking, Γ comprises the family of initial data 26 Since the family of Lorentz metrics is a locally convex space, all the (1 + φ λ )g ab will also be Lorentzian for small enough .
27 In order to try to address such problems with the compact-open and the Whitney topologies, Fletcher (2014) constructs a novel topology, in some ways similar to the compact-open topology but which yields the "natural" answers for Geroch's examples I discussed above. It would be of great interest to determine whether Fletcher's topology is appropriate for the characterization of the stability of singularities not confined to compact subsets of spacetime.
for FLRW spacetimes with compact Cauchy surfaces, sourced by a minimally coupled homogeneous scalar field. A little more precisely, one constructs the constraint-reduced phase space for an appropriately gauge-fixed Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity; restricting attention to compact 3-geometries sourced by homogeneous, minimally coupled scalar fields, one finds that the resulting space, remarkably, simplifies to the point that it itself is only four-dimensional. In essence, the reduced phase space is fully parametrized by the field-intensity φ of the scalar field and the Hubble expansion factor a on a Cauchy surface, and their "time-derivatives",φ andȧ, off the Cauchy surface; these quantities are constant on the Cauchy surface by homogeneity of the spacetime. The standardly defined Liouville measure on this phase space (modulo a few technical difficulties that do not concern us) is the GHS measure. All of a sudden, things are looking up for our eternally hopeful cosmologist who would engage in probabilistic reasoning, at least with regard to this (admittedly quite restricted, but still physically important) family of spacetimes-we have a rigorously defined Borel measure on a finite-dimensional space. (A Liouville measure is always a Borel measure.) It is not long, however, before a bucket of cold water is dashed in her face with the realization that, even though the space is finite-dimensional and the measure is Borel, it cannot be turned into a probability measure, for the measure it assigns the entire phase space is infinity-Γ is not compact.
Still, let us see whether we may not salvage something useful from this mess. We want to see whether the GHS measure can support any, even weak, form of probabilistic reasoning. Say we want to determine whether we can meaningfully attribute a probability to the occurrence of a physical property X, given the fixed reference class Γ. Let P X ⊂ Γ be the family of spacetimes evincing X.
There are four cases to consider.
1. P X is not measurable 2. µ ghs (P X ) < ∞ 3. µ ghs (Γ \ P X ) < ∞ 4. µ ghs (P X ) = ∞ and µ ghs (Γ \ P X ) = ∞
In the first case, we can say nothing at all, but one assumes or stipulates or hopes or demands or pleads or dreams that physically significant properties will not manifest such topological pathology in their distribution across spacetimes. In the second case, one can unambiguously attribute a probability of zero to it, and in the third a probability of one. In the fourth, one can say nothing simple or straightforward, without ambiguity, but now one does not even have the solace of yelling at the property and demanding that it not be pathological, as in the first case, for there is nothing pathological about such topological behavior at all.
There is, however, a "natural" schema for regularization procedures that one can use to try to derive a finite probability in such cases. 28 One approximates P X by a nested sequence of finitemeasure subsets of Γ, such that the union of the sequence is P X and the sequence of measures of the subsets, appropriately weighted, converge to a finite value in [0, 1]:
28 I follow here the exposition of Schiffrin and Wald (2012) .
2. find "physically appropriate" nested sequence of subsets of Γ, {S i } (i ∈ I + ), such that Γ = i S i and µ ghs (S i ) < ∞ 3. define Pr(P X ) = lim
Minisuperspace is σ-finite, so we're off to a good start. The serious problem arises with the second condition: one can get pretty much any answer one wants by judicious choice of {S i }, i.e., different regularization procedures can yield wildly different results.
A simple example illustrates the general form of the problem. What is the probability that a randomly chosen natural number is even? Prima facie, the question makes no sense. Let's fix a regularization procedure to attempt to address it. Let S i be the subset consisting of the first i natural numbers, in their normal ordering; then the regularization procedure yields the well defined probability 1 2 for a natural number's being even. Now, however, order the natural numbers as follows, {1, 3, 2, 5, 7, 4, . . .}, and again let S i be the subset consisting of the first i numbers. This yields a well defined probability, but now it is 1 3 . In cosmology, the problem is nicely illustrated by attempts to calculate the probability of inflation for spacetimes in Γ. Using regularization procedures derived from arguments based on (topological) stability of initial conditions yielding "slow-roll" inflation, Gibbons and Turok (2008) deduced extremely low probability for N 1 e-foldings of inflation, whereas Carroll and Tam (2010) deduced extremely high probability for N 1 e-foldings of inflation. Both analyses, moreover, have strong, physically plausible justifications for the regularization procedures they employ (i.e., their choice of {S i }). The resolution to this seemingly paradoxical state of affairs is that, in fixing the choice of {S i }, they each used a different criterion for topological stability for initial conditions yielding inflation. Roughly speaking, Carroll and Tam (2010) characterized topological stability based on the behavior of spacetimes entering an inflationary phase, whereas Gibbons and Turok (2008) did so based on spacetimes leaving the inflationary phase. This difference naturally leads them to consider the weight the GHS measure assigns to physically quite different open sets in Γ. It should therefore be no surprise that those open sets get assigned divergent weights.
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Even in the cases where one can unambiguously attribute a probability to the occurrence of a property based on µ ghs , one must ask about the physical significance of that probability, which, if it indeed has any, must come from the physical significance of the GHS measure itself, if it indeed has any. Schiffrin and Wald (2012) argue persuasively on multiple grounds that, at best, much work must be done to justify the physical significance of the GHS measure, and, at worst, it has none. They note that the standard justifications for the use of a Liouville measure are given by arguments based on special properties of the dynamical evolution of the system at issue and in particular on how it equilibrates. In particular, the arguments rely on the fact that the amount of 29 My diagnosis of the conflict between the two conclusions is in some ways similar to that of Schiffrin and Wald (2012) , but also differs in one important way, viz., my emphasis on the role topological stability plays in their arguments in fixing the open sets whose measures are relevant to the problem.
time the system spends in a portion of phase space is proportional to its Liouville measure. Those arguments, however, are not available when:
1. the system is not ergodic 2. OR one has not waited a time much greater than the equilibration time after the system was prepared 3. OR the system has a time-dependent Hamiltonian that varies on a timescale that is small or comparable to the equilibration time All of those conditions hold, however, for the canonical "dynamics" of that sector of general relativity represented by minisuperspace and its Hamiltonian. The system is not ergodic because the phase space has infinite measure-the dynamics cannot adequately explore the entire energy hypersurface in any finite time. For the same reason, there is no finite time in which the system can explore enough of the energy hypersurface in order for one to be able to conclude that it has satisfactorily equilibrated: the system always "remembers" its initial state, which precludes true statistical equilibration. That the time-dependent Hamiltonian in this case varies over timescales small compared to the equilibration time follows for the same reason.
In the face of these problems, Hollands and Wald (2002) and Schiffrin and Wald (2012) conclude that the only justification for the use of a Liouville measure in cosmology, in our current state of knowledge, is the bare assumption of the conceit of Penrose (1979) , to wit, that the universe's initial conditions were, by some appropriate process, randomly selected from a probability distribution fixed by the Liouville measure-the "creator" blindly threw a dart at a dartboard whose values are distributed according to it. Schiffrin and Wald (2012, p. 20) drily observe that this "has the status of an unsupported hypothesis." I demur. There is no tongue long enough and no cheek deep enough to endow this assumption with the honorific 'hypothesis'. There is no known physical justification for the use of the Liouville measure in cosmology.
5 Genericity, Stability, and Prediction
As I already remarked above, the space of Lorentz metrics over a manifold-the family of possible spacetime models having that as its underlying manifold-is an infinite-dimensional Fréchet manifold, and so by theorem 3.2 it has no non-trivial Borel measure. Standard probabilistic forms of argument in cosmology, however, mix topological and measure-theoretic concepts and methods in a way that depends on relations between topology and measure that are guaranteed to obtain only for Borel measures. In particular, those standard forms (always implicitly) assume at least one of the following propositions.
• Fix a "randomly selected" spacetime with a given property; if "small perturbations" (in a topological sense) destroy that property, then the collection of spacetimes with that property has zero measure. (The property is "scarce"; theorems showing the existence of the property are "rigid".)
• Fix a "randomly selected" spacetime with a given property; if "small perturbations" (in a topological sense) preserve that property, then the collection of spacetimes with that property has large (or at least discernibly non-zero) measure. (The property is "generic"; theorems showing the existence of the property are not "rigid".)
• If the collection of spacetimes with a given property has large (or at least discernibly non-zero) measure ("generic"), then that property is topologically stable under "small perturbations"
(not "rigid").
• If the collection of spacetimes with a given property has zero measure ("scarce"), then that property is topologically unstable under "small perturbations" ("rigid").
The probabilistic element of the conclusions can be expressed using the idea of likelihood (in a non-technical sense). Standard arguments then take the following form. Assume that the property is generic and that observations we make indicate that the actual spacetime approximately satisfies the conditions of an existence theorem for that property; then the topological stability under small perturbations entailed by genericity guarantees that the inevitable inaccuracies and inexactitudes in the observations cannot block the inference that the likelihood that the property obtains in the actual universe is high; and so we conclude that the likelihood is in fact high. Because one does not have a Borel measure in infinite-dimensional Fréchet spaces, however, none of these propositions hold in general for the space of Lorentz metrics over a fixed manifold.
30
A good example of a powerful probabilistic conclusion based on topological reasoning dressed up in measure-theoretic clothing pertains to the likelihood of finding singularities in a certain class of spacetimes. Geroch (1966) conjectured that essentially all spatially closed spacetimes either have singularities or do not satisfy the SEC, or, somewhat more precisely, that singularities are generic and their occurence is stable in the family of spatially closed spacetimes. 31 One compelling way to make Geroch's conjecture precise is given by the so-called Lorentzian splitting theorems.
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These theorems may be thought of as rigidity meta-theorems for singularity theorems invoking the 30 Hawking (1971) is particularly clear and explicit in sketching what I just proposed as a typical scheme for this sort of argument, though he does not note the mathematical issues I focus on. 31 The strong energy condition requires that for any timelike vector ξ a , Rmnξ m ξ n ≥ 0, where R ab is the Ricci tensor associated with the spacetime metric. 32 In order to state the most relevant splitting theorem, we need two definitions. First, the edge of an achronal, closed set Σ is the set of points p ∈ Σ such that every open neighborhood of p contains a point q ∈ I − (p), a point r ∈ I + (p) and a timelike curve from q to r that does not intersect Σ. Second, let Σ be a non-empty subset of spacetime; then a future inextendible causal curve is a future Σ-ray if it realizes the supremal Lorentzian distance between Σ and any of its points lying to the future of Σ (Galloway and Horta 1996) ; mutatis mutandis for a past Σ-ray. (If γ is a Σ-ray, it necessarily intersects Σ.)
Theorem 5.1 (Lorentzian splitting theorem) (M, g ab ) be a spacetime that contains a compact, acausal spacelike hypersurface Σ without edge and obeys the SEC; if it is timelike geodesically complete and contains a future Σ-ray γ and a past Σ-ray η such that I − (γ) ∩ I + (η) = ∅, then it is isometric to (R × Σ, tat b − h ab ), where (Σ, h ab ) is a compact Riemannian manifold and t a is a timelike vector-field in M.
In particular, (M, g ab ) must be globally hyperbolic and static. See Galloway and Horta (1996) for a proof.
there will be no singularities only when the spacetime is static and globally hyperbolic. 33 The reasoning then runs, static and globally hyperbolic spacetimes are "of measure zero" in the space of all spacetimes, and so being free of singularities is, under the ancillary conditions, unstable under arbitrarily small perturbations; thus, the likelihood of a "randomly selected" spatially closed spacetime being singularity-free is very low. 34 These conclusions, however, are simply not justified in the absence of a Borel measure, even if one had a physically appropriate topology to use for the rigorous characterization of stability in the first place.
An example of a different sort is provided by the anthropic argument of Weinberg (1987) predicting "the most likely" range of values for the cosmological constant Λ. His argument runs as follows:
1. work with a family of near-FLRW spacetimes (i.e., ones derived by allowing small perturbations off FLRW spacetimes, introducing small inhomogeneities);
2. then the existence of large, gravitationally bound systems places upper and lower bounds on possible values of Λ-if Λ is too positive, then potentially bound systems would be pulled apart, and if it is too negative, then the universe would recollapse before they can form;
3. argue for the topological stability of the formation of such bound systems under small changes in the value of Λ; 4. use an anthropic argument (the presence of conscious observers as a selection effect, assuming we are typical observers, i.e., that the value of Λ in our spacetime is typical of spacetimes with such observers) to fix the shape and peak of an appropriate measure on the family of near-FLRW spacetimes;
5. predict that the probability of the occurrence of a cosmological constant with a value lying in the range fixed in the second step is high, according to the posited measure.
The inadmissibility of the reasoning should, again, be clear. The argument assumes that there exists a measure and a topology that harmonize in such a way as to allow one both to characterize topological stability under small perturbations and to characterize typicality of a class of observers in a consistent way. On any reasonable family of near-FLRW spacetimes, however, there will be no such measure and topology, for the inhomogeneities ensure that the family will form an infinitedimensional space.
33 See Beem, Ehrlich, and Easley (1996, ch. 14) for a beautiful discussion of the rationale behind and intent of rigidity theorems, as well as an exposition of many of the most important ones. 34 See, e.g., Hawking (1971) , Penrose (1979) , and Senovilla (1998) for examples of physicists explicitly using such measure-theoretic language to characterize the genericity of the occurrence of singularities in these families of spacetimes, based on topological stability of the occurrence of singularities. Those same physicists also offer similar arguments for the genericity of singularities in spatially open spacetimes. One can make the conjecture in this case precise by using a variation of the Lorentzian splitting theorem given in footnote 32 (Galloway and Horta 1996) ; see, e.g., Ringström (2009) , for arguments of the sort I criticize based on the Lorentzian theorem for the spatially open case.
